December 28, 2020: Expanding the Moral Circle

   Most people believe that everyone's well-being should be equally valued. Factors that are unrelated to one's capacity to suffer should not be morally relevant--they should not make a difference in how we approach questions of morality. This is quite obvious in example: a person's race and gender expression, for example, should never be used as reasons to place a lower value on that person's interests. Despite the obviousness of this example, I believe that most people, myself included, are guilty of having gaping holes in their moral circle--the set of beings that they regard as deserving moral concern.

   Firstly, we can expand the moral circle with respect to geography. Peter Singer uses a powerful example: a very young Chinese girl was run over by a car and numerous people passed by her without helping. After much time, someone did finally help her, but sadly, it was too late and she ended up dying in the hospital. I think many would agree that this was an unnecessary tragedy allowed by the heinous neglect of the passersby and that, if put in the position of a passerby, they would surely have helped the poor girl. However, Singer argues, we may be guilty of similar neglect. The act of walking past a badly injured person whom we can save seems so blatantly wrong, I think, because of the immediacy of the person's suffering and your ability to alleviate it. However, it seems to me that we should care equally about the suffering of those whom we can't see. Massive numbers of people are suffering beyond our gaze and we ought to care about this too. To show this, imagine the same young girl who was run over. Now, suppose you are the distance of a five-hour flight away from the girl. It seems absurd to me that the girl's suffering doesn't matter when you are this distance away, but upon flying to the girl's location, it suddenly does. Further, many of us actually do have the capacity to help those far away. We are lucky enough to live in a time when we are increasingly connected with others around the globe. There is truly a multitude of causes to contribute to, some that offer incredible bang for your buck. For example, just $2 to the Against Malaria Foundation can cover an anti-malaria bed net, which lasts for 3 to 4 years, and protects on average two people. These nets protect people from the bites of malaria-carrying mosquitoes that would otherwise cause severe illness or death. Singer argues that, when faced with such suffering--even remote--and the means to reduce it, we have a moral responsibility to take action. In this way, our moral circle should not be constrained by geography.

   If we care about the suffering of conscious creatures, but are only concerned about the welfare of human beings and our pets, then we likely have a massive gap in our moral circle. It's uncontroversial that we should be concerned if our pets are suffering. Most people would find abusing a dog or neglecting a cat in extreme, curable pain to be immoral. However, many don't think much about the suffering of other animals, even though there is extremely strong scientific support (for example, The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness, made by a team of prominent international scientists) for mammals, and possibly many other animals, being conscious*. Given the billions (source) of beings that are slaughtered and face extreme suffering within our food systems each year, speciesism--differing treatment or moral consideration of individuals based on their species membership--may represent a massive moral blindspot for humanity.

   Finally, another potentially huge moral blindspot is related to time. If we think that the well-being of conscious creatures alive now matters, it seems like that of creatures alive in the future would also matter. Certainly, one's birth year has no bearing on their capacity to suffer and those alive now are simply the future generations of the past. Due to this, future beings may represent a third group to consider when pondering our moral blindspots. If you feel discouraged by the seeming intractability of helping future, nonexistent beings, then you might feel reassured by the ideas and efforts of "longtermism" (more info here and some recommendations for giving here (in the recommendations for the long-term future cause area)). Since humanity is probably in its nascent days and future humans are likely to vastly outnumber all humans that have ever lived so far (more on this), the expected value of efforts aimed at the long-term future could be staggering.

   You might feel overwhelmed by the number of beings and amount of suffering that may ought to be contained within the moral circle. The amount of suffering in the world is truly unfathomable. It used to make me feel like I wanted to pull away from the world. I'd internalize those emotions and feel depressed and deeply discouraged. Sadly, when the feelings settled, I'd move on with my life and focus on other things. However, these feelings affect me differently now. When I think about the massive amount of suffering in the world, I still feel overwhelmed and saddened, but I feel less of an urge to retreat from the world and bury these feelings. Instead, it feels like an incredible call to go out into the world and take action--a call to get to work. These feelings of sadness and despair over the world's suffering are powerful and they can be used to fuel action instead of stagnant depression. May reality live up to our aspirations for the world and may we be driven rather than defeated by the things we cannot accept.



*Some of this scientific evidence is made up of observations of animals performing complex, intelligent behaviors. There are some philosophical points that can cast doubt on whether such observations can be used as evidence that a being is conscious. Take conscious inessentialism, which is the idea that "for any intelligent activity i, performed in any cognitive domain d, even if we do i with conscious accompaniments, i can in principle be done without these conscious accompaniments" (Consciousness Reconsidered, Flanagan 1992). On this view, it may be that consciousness is not necessary for performing sophisticated operations, like predicting future weather events and stashing food in a different place based on these predictions. Good examples are machine learning algorithms that can make sophisticated recommendations or predictions based on a very large set of data. This is certainly a complex behavior, but most don't view machine learning algorithms as being conscious, at least not currently.
While these considerations might make one more reluctant to conclude that certain animals are conscious based on them performing certain behaviors, I believe these would also force us to question some widely held beliefs. Conscious inessentialism would also apply to humans. This may sound strange, but we don't actually know with certainty that other humans are in fact conscious. Of course, no one (that I've ever encountered) actually operates under the assumption that other people aren't conscious. I know that I am, and by strong analogy, I infer that others also are. That is, others share many of my behaviors, have the same evolutionary history and central nervous system, exhibit complex emotional responses like me, etc. So, I infer that others are also conscious. However, conscious inessentialism, when applied to humans, would cast doubt on many of these pieces of evidence. If it turns out that other humans' sophisticated behaviors and emotional responses don't require consciousness to perform, then these are not evidence of them being conscious. However, that other humans aren't conscious is not a desirable conclusion--it is contrary to our common beliefs and would have shocking moral implications. I think it's uncertain whether conscious inessentialism is true. Further, even if it is true, it's still not clear how extensive or rare consciousness is--many non-human animals could still, of course, be conscious. On the other hand, we also shouldn't take observations of intelligent behavior as unequivocal proof of consciousness.
Ultimately, my current feeling is that, if we are willing to use the above kind of reasoning by analogy to conclude that other humans are conscious, then I don't see why such reasoning wouldn't also include many non-human animals. In the interest of not belaboring the point, I'll leave it here, but may expand on this more in subsequent posts if these thoughts seem underdeveloped.

I might write on this in the future, but for more details on effective giving, see here and here.

This post was strongly influenced by this page.


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